We use a Hotelling linear city model to study competition between open source and proprietary software, where only the producer of the proprietary software aims at maximizing the profit. The producer of the proprietary software must decide on compatibility. Different compatibility strategies will lead to different network externality, and thus result in different profit for the producer of the proprietary software. We found that the proprietary producer's choice of compatibility strategy depends on the market coverage conditions. When the market is fully covered, one-way compatibility is the best strategy for the proprietary software. When the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy. Such results are not affected by software quality. Furthermore, when the provider of the open source software pursues the maximum market share rather than reacts passively, two-way compatibility would be the best choice for both the open source and the proprietary software. Moreover, the proprietary software producer does not favor its proprietary rival changing to open source software. Such a change may lower the social welfare. 
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the striking success of open source software, which allows software developers to use shared source codes, identify and correct errors, and redistribute the source codes (OSI 2001 , O'Reilly 1999 . One of the most famous and successful open source software projects is Linux, which commands a third market share within the server operating system market, and whose share is expected to grow to 41 percent by 2005 (International Data Corporation IDC 2002 . Another well known example is Apache, which supports 67 percent of web sites on the Internet (Netcraft Web Server Survey 2004) . Other successful open source software products have had significant market shares in their product categories. For instance,
Sendmail, an open source email transfer program, carries an estimated 80% of the entire world's e-mail traffic (Weber 2004) .
Open source software threatens proprietary software producers. To survive and win the maximum profit in the battle with the open source software, proprietary software producers may adopt one of four different compatibility strategies, i.e., incompatibility, two-way compatibility, inward compatibility, and outward compatibility. In the case of web browsers, Internet Explorer, a proprietary software product, is two-way compatible with Mozilla, an open source product. Files created for IE users can be used by Mozilla users and vice versa. 2 We use the term 'proprietary software' as non-free software (Working Group on Libre Software 2000) 3 Katz and Shapiro (1998) defined compatibility as follows: "When two programs can communicate with one another and/or be used with the same complementary system components, they are said to be compatible".
In the web server market, Microsoft IIS (a proprietary web server) is inward compatible with Apache (an open source web server): Microsoft IIS can support both PHP and ASP, server side programming languages. Thus, programs designed for Apache using PHP language can be executed in IIS.
However, since ASP belongs to Microsoft and can not execute on Apache, the programs designed for IIS using ASP are not usable in Apache. and propose the best compatibility strategy for the propriety software producer. 4 The main findings in this part are: When the market is fully covered, i.e., when all the consumers purchase one of the two products, inward compatibility is the best strategy. However, when the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy. Furthermore, the welfare analysis provides some implications on how the welfare would be affected by different parameters, such as the network externality intensity and software quality. suppose that the open source software aims at maximizing the marker share rather than reacts passively. In such a case, two-way compatibility is a Nash Equilibrium in both fully covered market and partly covered market. proprietary software under different scenarios. Section 9 discusses the results and suggests possible directions for future work.
Literature Review
The most widely investigated research question in past literature on open source software is to identify the economic and non-economic motivations for individual developers to contribute to open source software (Lerner and Tirole 2002 , Lakhani and Wolf 2003 , Hann et al. 2002 . Currently, researchers classify the possible reasons into intrinsic motivation, such as intellectual stimulation (Lakhani and Wolf 2003) , and extrinsic motivation, including career concerns (Lerner and Tirole 2002) and peer recognition (Raymond 1999 , Vostroknutov 2002 .
Another theme of prior research focuses on the quality of open source software and the competition between open source and proprietary software. An important conclusion is that open source software is not necessarily inferior in quality to proprietary software (Mishra et al. 2002 , Dalle and Jullien 2002 , Kuan 2001 , Johnson 2001 , Bessen 2002 ). This conclusion is derived from models of different aspects: Mishra et al. (2002) Kuan (2001) demonstrated that open source software has a higher rate of quality improvement than proprietary software; Johnson (2001) modeled open source software as the private provision of public goods; Dalle and Jullien (2002) presented organizational structure and compatibility as key factors to the quality of open source software.
Within the research theme outlined above, one strand has been to consider the competition between open source and proprietary software. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) modeled the competition between Windows and Linux as a dynamic "mixed duopoly", where a not-for-profit competitor interacts with a for-profit competitor. What the study named mixed duopoly differs from the well-investigated mixed oligopoly competition, where one party pursues profit maximization while the other (most probably a public producer) aims at welfare maximization (Cremer et al. 1989 , 1991 , DeFraja and Delbono 1989 , Fershtman 1990 , Fjell and Pal 1996 , White 1996 . Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) showed that, as long as Windows' pricing decision was not myopic, the result of the competition would be either the coexistence of the two products or Linux being driven out of the market.
Our paper takes a similar approach but differs from Casadesus-Masanell and
Ghemawat (2003) in two aspects. The main difference is in the research questions.
Our work focuses on strategic choices for compatibility -a topic seldom investigated in previous studies on open source software. We seek to find the best compatibility strategy rather than predict the results of competition. Furthermore, we model the consumers' heterogeneous preferences for products, which depend on two factors: the learning cost of adopting a software product varies for different consumers, and the difference in their past experiences, i.e., the extent of 'lock-in' is different among 
Basic Model
Consider a software market where two software products are located at the ends of a unit line, i.e., the open source software (O) is located at x=0 and the proprietary software (P) is located at x=1 (see Figure 1) Katz and Shapiro (1985) , the network externalities are a linear function of the number of users who adopt the same or compatible software products.
Figure 1: The Basic Hotelling Model
In the basic model, we assume that the two products have the same inherent quality s and are incompatible, and the market is fully covered, i.e., all the consumers choose to use one of the two software products. This is always true when the benefit of the product is sufficiently large. 
By solving the profit maximization problem with respect to p, we get:
, where * p and * π denote the equilibrium price and profit respectively. M to denote that of the open source software, we have: 
Compatibility and Profits
In the basic model, we assumed that the open source and proprietary software were incompatible. However, the proprietary software producer may also choose for its product to be compatible to some degree with the open source software. Which is the best strategy? How does this compatibility decision change the profitability of proprietary software? To answer these questions, we extend our basic model to consider different degrees of compatibility. As in common with the Hotelling model, the analysis depends on whether the market is fully covered.
Fully Covered Market
We firstly present how the utility functions of the open source and proprietary software consumers change according to different compatibility strategy when the market is fully covered. Next, we summarize the net utilities of the open source and proprietary software consumers and the equilibrium outcomes under different compatibility strategies in Table 1 .
Two-way compatibility
Two-way compatibility is the case where the open source and proprietary software are compatible with each other. Then, users of the two software products share the same network externality.
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Since the market is fully covered, the total number of software users is 1. Thus, the network externality is
Inward compatibility
We define 
s t k Table 3 and Table 4 .
• Fully Covered Market 
Best Compatibility Strategy
We examine the best compatibility strategy under different market coverage conditions by comparing the equilibrium outcomes in section 4 and section 5, and derive the following results:
Proposition 1
A proprietary software producer should never choose incompatibility or outward compatibility.
<proof> Please see the Appendix 1.
Under all conditions, the proprietary producer should not choose incompatibility or outward compatibility. Intuitively, to the proprietary software producer, inward compatibility can bring more profit than incompatibility by allowing proprietary software users to share the network benefits from open source users. Furthermore, incompatibility is always better than outward compatibility, in that it prevents open source software users to share the network benefits from proprietary software users.
Therefore, incompatibility and outward compatibility would never be the best strategy.
Consistent with these results, in reality, outward compatibility can hardly be observed.
Incompatibility is also rare.
Proposition 2
When the market is partly covered, a proprietary software producer earns highest profit from two-way compatibility, followed by outward compatibility, and last, incompatibility or outward compatibility.
<proof> 
Proposition 3.1
When the market is fully covered, the proprietary software producer earns highest profit from inward compatibility, and lowest profit from outward compatibility. However, the profitability of two-way compatibility and incompatibility depends on the quality difference between the open source software and the proprietary software.
Proposition 3.2
When the market is fully covered and the quality difference between proprietary software and open source software is sufficiently small that
, the proprietary software producer earns highest profit from inward compatibility, followed by two-way compatibility, incompatibility, and last, outward compatibility.
Proposition 3.3
When the market is fully covered and the quality difference between proprietary software and open source software is sufficiently large that
, the proprietary software producer earns highest profit from inward compatibility, followed by incompatibility, two-way compatibility, and last, outward compatibility.
A covered market indicates that the two products are in severe competition, i.e., In a covered market, the profit ranking of the incompatibility and two-way compatibility varies according to the quality difference between the open source and proprietary software. On the one hand, the price of the proprietary software with two-way compatibility is higher than that with incompatibility (see Table 3 ). On the other hand, the market share of the proprietary software with two-way compatibility may be lower than that with incompatibility. This could happen when the proprietary software has sufficiently higher quality and becomes the dominating software in the market. Combining the price and market share factors together, we may conclude that once the quality of the proprietary software is high enough and the market share factor dominates the price factor, the proprietary software producer will choose incompatibility rather than two-way compatibility. The change of the profit ranking of incompatibility and two-way compatibility is consistent with the argument of Katz and Shapiro (1985) . They develop a static model of oligopoly and conclude that the firms with large existing network externalities will tend to be against compatibility. In contrast, firms with small existing network externalities will tend to favor product compatibility. In the case of
proprietary vs. open source software, when the proprietary software has sufficiently high quality, its existing network externalities are large. Hence, the proprietary software producer favors incompatibility over two-way compatibility. In contrast, when the quality of the proprietary software is sufficiently small, proprietary software has small existing network externalities. Therefore, two-way compatibility is more profitable than incompatibility.
Moreover, we extend the conclusion of Katz and Shapiro (1985) by adding the inward and outward compatibility, which they did not consider. We show that, in both fully covered and partly covered markets, inward compatibility is always a superior strategy to incompatibility. Hence, their conclusion that incompatibility can be the best strategy may not hold if inward compatibility can be realized.
Welfare
In Firstly, it is intuitive that the increase in quality will raise the social welfare.
Secondly, with the increase of the network externality intensity γ , the consumer surplus of both the open source users and the proprietary software users will increase.
Thus, the social welfare will increase. Thirdly, higher k increases the quality of the open source software. Hence, consumer surplus increases. However, the increase in k reduces sellers' profit. From the comparative statics, it can be seen that the increase in consumer surplus dominates the decrease in sellers' profit, and welfare increases with the increase in k.
Moreover, the first order derivative of W with respect to t is:
7 We also calculated welfare with two-way compatibility when the market is fully covered. The results of comparative statics are the same. , and show that with the increase of taste difference t, the social welfare will decrease.
Increase in s
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On the one hand, higher t binds consumers to the proprietary software and increases the monopoly power of the proprietary software. Thus, the sellers' profits will increase. On the other hand, higher t lowers the consumer surplus.
From Figure 3 , we can see that the latter impact dominates the former one and social welfare decreases with the increase in t. <proof> Please see the Appendix 3.
The different aims of the open source software will affect the compatibility choices of the proprietary software. As mentioned previously, when the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is a win-win strategy for both open source and proprietary software, and therefore, a Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, when the market is fully covered and both parties have their maximization aims, if either party chooses incompatibility, the other will choose compatibility to share benefit through network externality. Therefore, two-way compatibility will be a Nash Equilibrium.
'Proprietary vs. Open' and 'Proprietary vs. Proprietary'
Today, opening the source code has become a trend that more and more <proof> Please see the Appendix 5.
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Such results are counterintuitive. Generally, it is believed that the open source software will benefit the social welfare by providing free high quality software.
However, the results indicate that this is not always the case. The change of the
proprietary software to open source software may lower social welfare under the condition that the consumers taste difference t is sufficiently high.
To get a better understand of the results, we draw Figure 4 and show how the value of ( ) 
Conclusion
We used the Hotelling model to investigate competition between open source and proprietary software. Firstly, we focused on the compatibility choices of the proprietary software. It was shown that the best compatibility strategy depends on the degrees of market coverage. When the market is fully covered, inward compatibility is the best strategy. When the market is partly covered, however, two-way compatibility is the best strategy. Moreover, the welfare analysis implied that the increase of t (the taste difference of consumers) may decrease the social welfare, although it can increase the profit of the proprietary software producer. It is important to consider how the model's simplifying assumptions affect the conclusions. Firstly, we have assumed the compatibility strategies are chosen by the proprietary software producer. However, in the software market, the compatibility choice is decided not only by software producers but also by the software architecture.
Sometimes, compatibility may not be feasible because the architecture of the two software products is quite different, while other times, the inward compatibility may be difficult to be technically implemented. Our results may not be applicable in such cases. Therefore, the best compatibility strategy may change. Such limitation of the analysis suggests directions for future study. In the further work, it would be interesting to consider how the installed user base affects the compatibility choices of the proprietary software.
Finally, for tractability, we have assumed consumers taste difference is greater than the network externality intensity. If this assumption is violated, the equilibrium results are unstable. The switch of the marginal consumer from one software to the other results in that every consumer follows the switch. Such a tipping market needs further investigation.
Appendix 1. Best Compatibility Strategy
Fully Covered Market
In the proof procedures, strategy I denotes two-way compatible. Strategy II denotes inward compatibility. Strategy III and Strategy IV means the outward and incompatibility, respectively. 
Equal base-level qualities
By (A-1) and (A-2), it can be derived that *( )
We can get that :
Combining (A-6) with (A-3), it can be derived that:
Proposition 3.2 is proved.
Considering (A-7): Therefore, it can be derived that
Combining (A-3), (A-7), (A-9) and (A-11), it can be derived that
Proposition 3.3 is thus proved.
Proposition 3.2 and proposition 3.3 lead to proposition 3.1 spontaneously.
Partly Covered Market
Equal base-level qualities Table 2 , we have:
By (A-12) and (A-13), it can be derived that *( ) Table 4 , we have:
Different base-level qualities
By (A-14) and (A-15), it can be derived that *( )
Such results are the same as those when open source and proprietary software products have the equal base-level quality. Therefore, the proposition 2 is proved.
Proposition 2 and proposition 3.1 prove proposition 1 spontaneously.
Appendix 2. Calculation of the Welfare
When the market is fully covered, proprietary software producer will choose inward compatibility. Under such scenario, the welfare denoted as W is calculated as: 
Fully Covered Market
Suppose the open source software aims at maximizing market share and the proprietary software pursues the maximum profits. And they choose the compatibility strategy simultaneously. The payoffs under each strategy are listed in Table A 
Partly Covered Market
Similarly, when the market is not fully covered, the payoffs under each strategy are listed in Table A The Nash equilibrium can be solved as (Compatible, Compatible) . Therefore, when the market is not covered, both open source and proprietary software will choose to be compatible with their rival, and the result is two-way compatibility.
Proprietary Software
Therefore, the equilibrium profit of the "proprietary vs. proprietary" case is higher than that of the "open vs. proprietary" case. 
Two-way Compatibility
